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Abstract
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincen-
tives. As such, there has been a large debate of whether individuals on DI receipt are capable of
work. In this thesis, I provide new estimates of the additional earnings and labor supply potentials
of Norwegian DI recipients. By using a propensity score matching method, I reweight the sam-
ple of rejected DI applicants in order to estimate the counterfactual outcomes of DI beneficiaries if
they had not been awarded DI benefits. I find that Norwegian DI recipients exhibit limited earnings
and labor supply potentials. I also find evidence of rejected applicants not necessarily serving as a
valid control group for allowed applicants. In the years after the final allowance decision, I find that
the fraction of recipients participating in the labor force would at most have been 20-25 percentage
points higher if the recipients were not awarded DI benefits. I also find greater responsiveness to the
allowance decision of younger applicants, suggesting greater responses to economic incentives of
younger applicants.
The liberalizations of the disability screening processes in most countries have led to a debate of
whether the DI programs do not only serve as insurance against health shocks, but also have become
a gateway for voluntary early retirement. Therefore, I investigate the behavior of Norwegian DI
recipients around the transition to the retirement program. Around this transition, the individuals
are eligible for the same amount of benefits, but work incentives change significantly. I find that
approximately 2% of the recipients who were 62-65 years of age when awarded DI benefits increase
earnings as they are transferred to the retirement program, and are no longer bound by the earnings
restrictions implied by the DI program. I also find strong evidence of bunching behavior of DI
recipients below the maximum allowed level of earnings for DI beneficiaries.
Keywords: Disability Insurance, disincentive effects, potential earnings and labor supply, retirement,
bunching.
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1 Introduction
In most developed countries, there have been significantly rising rates of participation in disability in-
surance (DI) programs during the last half century. Such programs have often been criticized for being
one of the primary reasons for increased social security spending, but also for disincentivizing work
(Autor & Duggan 2006). In Norway, the fraction of the adult population on disability rolls has grown
from less than 2% to almost 10% during the last half century.1 Participation rates are expected to reach
7% in the US by 2018, and more than 7% of the working age population is already receiving disability
benefits in the UK (Kostol & Mogstad 2015; OECD 2010). Because of this, DI has become a consid-
erable expenditure for the society as a whole, amounting to approximately 4-5% of GDP in Norway
(OECD 2010). In addition, the liberalization of the disability screening processes have lead to a debate
on whether the DI programs do not only serve as insurance against health shocks, but also have become
a gateway for voluntary early retirement (Autor & Duggan 2006). Prominent researchers have argued
that the expenditures are increasing at rates which are unsustainable in the long run, especially as the
average DI recipient gets younger and has longer life expectancy.2
The research has traditionally focused on the disincentive effects of DI, and the potential earnings
and labor supply of allowed DI applicants in particular. Most of the research comes from the US,
investigating US applicants. To assess external validity of the US research, there are two particularly
important concerns. Firstly, there may be differences between the programs and the requirements for
enrolling in the programs. Secondly, there may be differences between US and Norwegian applicants.
As such, the US findings are not necessarily transferable to Norwegian applicants.
This thesis aims to provide more knowledge about the behavior of Norwegian DI applicants, and in
particular of the potential earnings and labor supply of DI beneficiaries. To achieve this, I investigate
two different age-groups of DI applicants from the same initial sample. The first method investigates DI
applicants aged 18-61 years, which represents the majority of all applicants in Norway. I use the initial
starting point of Bound (1989), who uses rejected applicants as a control group for allowed applicants.
The validity of Bound’s approach relies on the assumption of rejected applicants being healthier than
1See Appendix Figure A.1 for details about the development of individuals on DI receipt in Norway.
2See for instance Autor & Duggan (2003) and Autor & Duggan (2006).
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allowed applicants. Bound argued that if there were no further differences between allowed and rejected
applicants other than health, the earnings and labor supply of rejected applicants serve as upper-bound
estimates of the potential earnings and labor supply of allowed applicants. In order to investigate the
validity of this hypothesis, I use an approach similar to the one of Singleton (2012), who reweights the
sample of rejected applicants and controls for differences in observable pre-application characteristics
between allowed and rejected applicants. By doing this, I also get new estimates of the potential earnings
and labor supply of Norwegian DI recipients.
An advantage of my data, is that I am able to go beyond the usual measures of labor supply. In most
of the traditional literature, labor supply has been measured by earnings being greater than the maximum
allowed level of earnings in order to be eligible for DI benefits, known as the SGA (substantial gainful
activity) threshold. An important part of this thesis has been to provide data on working hours, allowing
for important new estimates of the labor supply of DI recipients both at the extensive and the intensive
margin. A further advantage is that I am able to identify applicants who reapply for DI benefits. Because
the initially rejected applicants are able to reapply for DI, the initially rejected applicants may not give
correct indications of the effects of a DI rejection in the longer run, as some rejected applicants may
get awarded DI benefits at a later stage. This is a particular issue in Norway, where the majority of the
initially denied applicants are eventually awarded DI benefits. The literature has dealt with this problem
in different ways. One approach has been to disregard the applicants that are allowed DI benefits at a later
stage.3 However, this approach only allows for interpretations of a restricted sample of DI recipients,
and in particular the initially allowed applicants. Thus, one does not necessarily get the full picture
of a DI award decision by only investigating the behavior of this group. To overcome these issues, I
normalize the years of DI award on the final observed DI application of the respective applicants. This
approach allows for investigating the behavior of the full sample of allowed applicants (including those
who were initially rejected, but were allowed at a later stage), and also the behavior of rejected applicants
conditional on not reapplying.
The insights of the empirical analysis include several important findings. First, I find that Norwegian
DI recipients exhibit limited earnings and labor supply potentials. One year after the award decision, the
fraction of recipients participating in the labor force would at most have been 21 percentage points higher
if the recipients were not awarded DI benefits. Three and five years after the award decision, the fraction
of recipients participating in the labor force would at most have been 22 and 24 percentage points higher,
3See for instance von Wachter et al. (2011).
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respectively. Secondly, there is significant heterogeneity in the behavior of applicants around the award
decision. Among younger applicants aged 18-39 years, there is evidence of greater responsiveness to not
being awarded DI benefits in the longer run. I also find significant responsiveness to not being awarded
DI of the rejected applicants that are considered to be totally disabled. Because of the differences in
observable pre-application characteristics, I also find evidence of rejected applicants not necessarily
serving as valid upper-bound estimates of the potential earnings and labor supply of allowed applicants.
However, there is evidence of Bound’s assumption being valid for younger applicants aged 18-39 years,
and also for totally disabled applicants.
This analysis complements a wide literature on the potential earnings and labor supply of DI re-
cipients, and particularly of the papers that I use for estimation.4 Bound (1989) finds that labor force
participation rate of US DI recipients at most would have been 30 percentage points higher if they had
not received DI benefits. Singleton (2012) finds supporting evidence of Bound’s assumption, showing
that the estimated earnings and labor supply of the rejected applicants once weighted were lower than of
the observed rejected applicants. My findings do not support these findings. However, there are several
reasons for the limited comparability of my investigation to the US findings. First, these analyses inves-
tigate applicants from a different period of time. Also, they define allowed applicants only as initially
allowed applicants, while I include those who were awarded DI benefits at a later stage. My investigation
most of all serves as evidence of the behavior of Norwegian DI applicants, and complements a growing
literature on the behavior of Norwegian DI recipients. Kostol & Mogstad (2014) finds that the labor
force participation rate is 24-30 percentage points higher among rejected applicants compared to DI
beneficiaries. I find somewhat lower estimates, which may be due to the differences between observable
pre-application characteristics of allowed and rejected applicants.
In the second part of the thesis I investigate allowed DI applicants aged 62-65 years at the DI award
decision, and in particular the behavior of these individuals as they were transferred to retirement benefits
at the age of 67 years. As the Norwegian DI beneficiaries were eligible for the same amount of retirement
benefits as DI benefits, the level of public transfers that the individuals received did in general not
change. The earnings restrictions that applied for Norwegian DI recipients during the time period of
interest, however, involved strong disincentives of work for DI recipients. These restrictions did not
apply to the former DI recipients as they were transferred to the retirement program. Because of this,
4Other recent studies that investigate the potential earnings and labor supply of DI recipients are e.g. Chen & van der
Klaauw (2008), von Wachter et al. (2011), French & Song (2014) and Maestas et al. (2013).
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the work incentive effects of the recipients changed significantly. These changes in work incentives are
similar to the recently adopted rules in Norway that applied from the 1st of January 2015. Thus, the
responsiveness of retired beneficiaries could give us some indications of the effects of the new rules of
the Norwegian DI program. However, the effects are not directly comparable as there would most likely
be significant differences in the responsiveness of individuals on DI receipt and retired beneficiaries.
By investigating the DI recipients being transferred to the retirement program, I find significant re-
sponsiveness to the changes in work incentives around the transition. First, at least 2% of the recipients
do exhibit additional earnings potentials. Thus, these individuals may also exhibit additional work ca-
pacity. Although I find greater responsiveness of younger applicants in the upper-bound analysis, this
section proves that even the oldest DI beneficiaries may respond to improved work incentives. As DI
beneficiaries keep the same amount of benefits as they are transferred to the retirement program, this
estimate may be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of the fraction of DI recipients who exhibit ad-
ditional earnings potentials. This relies on the assumption of greater responsiveness of DI beneficiaries
compared to retired recipients, which would be consistent with my findings in the upper-bound analysis.
However, the fraction of recipients exhibiting additional earnings and labor supply potentials could be
higher considering the counterfactual state of not being awarded DI benefits (as the upper-bound anal-
ysis do). The earnings restrictions implied by the rules of the DI program suggest that some recipients
may bunch below the maximum allowed level of earnings. I find clear evidence of bunching behavior
of DI recipients below the particular threshold before being transferred to the retirement program. This
behavior was no longer evident after the transition as the earnings restrictions did not apply for individ-
uals receiving retirement benefits. Finally, there is evidence of individuals with a positive labor supply
increasing labor supply at the intensive margin post the transition. I find no evidence of individuals
increasing labor supply at the extensive margin because of the improved work incentives.
As the DI programs have been criticized for being gateways to early retirement, this investigation
intends to complement a fairly small literature on the behavior of DI recipients that are awarded DI
benefits at a rather late stage. Maestas & Yin (2008) find that labor force participation increased as the
US recipients were transferred to retirement benefits. I find no such evidence of recipients increasing
labor supply at the extensive margin, suggesting limited external validity of the US findings. This inves-
tigation also adds to the Norwegian literature by showing significant bunching behavior of Norwegian
DI beneficiaries. In addition, this investigation also complements a small literature on how Norwegian
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DI beneficiaries respond to financial incentives. Kostol & Mogstad (2014) take advantage of a policy
change that induce Norwegian DI benefits to work, and find that beneficiaries aged 18-49 years increase
labor supply as they were able to keep a certain fraction of the DI benefits. I show that even the older DI
beneficiaries may respond to economic incentives.
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. In section 2, I review some of the relevant existing
literature, and I also review some important background material regarding the Norwegian DI program.
Section 3 describes the data, and the sample selection used for the econometric analysis. In section 4,
I outline the econometric approach and provide estimates of the additional earnings and labor supply
potentials of DI recipients. In section 5, I investigate the behavior of DI recipients being automatically
transferred to the retirement program at the age of 67 years. Section 6 sums up the results and concludes.
2 Background
In this section I start by reviewing some of the existing literature regarding disability insurance, and of
the disincentive effects of DI in particular. Because I investigate Norwegian DI applicants, I will also
review some important aspects about the DI program in Norway.
2.1 Related Literature
As DI rolls have grown heavily over the last decades, a wide literature on the causes and consequences
has developed as well. The disincentive effects of DI have traditionally been a very challenging field
of investigation as there have been few possibilities of using experimental data. As such, the early
literature relied on strict assumptions and often used regression methods that have been heavily criticized
in retrospect as they have proved to overestimate the disincentive effects.
Bound (1989) was the first to suggest using rejected applicants as a control group for allowed ap-
plicants. He argued, that if the rejected applicants were healthier than the allowed applicants, then the
potential labor supply of the rejected applicants would be greater than for the allowed applicants. Thus,
the observed earnings and labor supply of the rejected applicants would serve as upper-bound estimates
of the potential earnings and labor supply of allowed applicants. This assumption was heavily debated,
in particular by Bound and Parsons,5 but has nevertheless influenced the subsequent literature to a great
extent. A more recent paper using the same starting point is the one of von Wachter et al. (2011), who
5See Bound (1991) and Parsons (1991).
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contribute with updated results and a few extensions to Bound’s original approach. Singleton (2012)
provides a short paper using the same framework as Bound (1989), but in addition tries to control for
the differences in pre-application characteristics between allowed and rejected applicants.
Another heavily debated area has been whether the decline in labor force participation during the
last decades can be attributed to the growth in DI rolls. Autor & Duggan (2003) estimate that the growth
in DI rolls doubled the labor force exit propensity of displaced high school dropouts in the period 1984-
2001. A more recent paper connecting DI application to unemployment rates in the US is the one
of Maestas et al. (2015). They find that the number of DI applications increased significantly as the
unemployment rates rose in the aftermath of the great recession, but that almost the entire growth in DI
applications could be attributed to the increase in applications that were rejected.
Maestas & Yin (2008) take advantage of US DI recipients being transferred to retirement benefits
when reaching the full retirement age. They estimate that labor force participation would have been
around 10 percentage point greater for these recipients in the absence of DI award. The authors argue that
their estimates can be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the disincentive effects of DI as retiring
people should have lower potential labor supply than younger individuals. Chen & van der Klaauw
(2008) also provide estimates of the potential labor supply of allowed applicants taking advantage of
age-based discontinuities in the eligibility determination process in the US. They find that labor force
participation would have been at most 20% higher in the absence of DI award.
In the more recent literature it has become popular to take advantage of random assignment of
examiners with different levels of leniency deciding whether people are eligible for DI or not. Maestas
et al. (2013) use the variation of initial examiners in the US to show that the incidence of DI receipt
reduces earnings and employment among allowed applicants. French & Song (2014) use the same
approach exploiting the leniency of US appeal judges, and get very similar results as to those of Maestas
et al. (2013). Both papers estimate that labor force participation would have been around 27% greater in
the absence of DI for the so called marginal applicants (those who not only get DI because of their health
conditions, but also because of the leniency of the examiners). This instrumental variable strategy has
also been used for other purposes in the DI research, as judicial decisions potentially affect a wide range
of variables at the individual as well as the family level. Dahl et al. (2013) deploy the same strategy in
order to investigate how the usage of DI benefits are reinforced between generations in Norway.
The research in Norway has also picked up in recent years. Kostol & Mogstad (2014) take advantage
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of a policy change based on past enrollment dates which creates a sharp RD design. The beneficiaries
that were granted DI before a particular cut-off date were able to keep approximately $0.4 for every
$1 they earned above the SGA threshold, and thus got significantly more incentives to return to work.
The paper show that three years after the implementation of the program, labor force participation had
increased by 8.5 percentage points for recipients aged 18-49 years. Dahl et al. (2013) find that welfare
receipt in one generation significantly causes more participation in the next generation. By using exoge-
nous variation in the allocation of judges, they find that the participation of the children whose parents
have been awarded DI increase with 6 percentage points within 5 years, and 12 percentage points within
10 years after the allowance decision of their respective parents. Investigations about the insurance value
and welfare effects of DI in Norway have also picked up, and longer-term projects studying these issues
are currently ongoing. Kostol & Mogstad (2015) investigate the behavior of applicants around the years
of decision, and find relatively smooth consumption and disposable income for the different types of
applicants around these years.
2.2 The Norwegian DI program
The Norwegian DI program is designed to provide partial earnings replacements to adults in the working
age population that are incapable of work. More specifically, it provides cash transfers to workers under
the full retirement age that are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a
physical or medical condition that have lasted for at least a year. Only individuals aged 18-67 years
are eligible for DI benefits. When DI recipients turn 67 years, they are automatically transferred to
retirement benefits.
As a replacement for lost earnings, the recipients receive benefits based on past earnings history. The
proportion of income that is replaced decreases as past earnings increase so that low-wage workers get
a larger share of their earnings replaced compared to high-wage workers. If a recipient has no earnings
history he will be guaranteed a minimum level of benefits. Special rules apply to the young and disabled.
The program is part of a broader social security system and is one of the largest transfer programs in
Norway. It is financed through taxes paid by i.e. employers.
The application and determination process goes through several steps. To apply for DI benefits,
an individual must first get permission from his family doctor before submitting the application to a
social security administration office. If the non-medical criteria are met (such as being below the regular
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retirement age of 67 years), the disability examiners review the medical condition of the individual.
This process is short if the individual is obviously disabled, but it could also be quite extensive if there is
doubt about the condition of the individual and how much it affects the individual’s ability to work. The
examiners then look at factors such as health, age, education and transferability of the applicant’s skills.
If the examiners decide that the impairment makes the individual unable to participate in any substantial
gainful activities, a disability award is made.
Of all initial applications, around 85% of these are allowed.6 If an applicant does not get awarded
DI benefits he can decide to appeal the decision. Around 25% of the initial denials are appealed, but
only around 15% of these claims are allowed at this level. This is very different from the US system,
where only approximately 33% of all applicants are initially allowed. However, the appeal process plays
a much more important role in the US, amounting to approximately half of the initial denials. Of those
who appeal, approximately 67% are eventually allowed. This means that around half of the DI awards
in the US are allowed on appeal.7
In 2004, the Norwegian government introduced new rules that allowed for the possibility of DI
to be awarded for a restricted period of time. In order to be eligible for this program, the disorders
of the individuals must have been expected to last for at least 5 years. These kinds of temporary DI
benefits were mainly targeted to individuals whose health conditions were not sufficient to participate
in substantial gainful activity, but whose conditions were expected to improve. Temporary DI benefits
were phased out in 2010, and the program was instead merged with the new program of sick pay.
From the 1st of January 2015 there have been substantial changes in the rules of the DI program. In
short, the new rules involve changes in the taxation of earnings and DI benefits of recipients, and also
changes in the way that the benefits are calculated. With the new rules, earnings and DI benefits are
taxed by the same rates as labor income for non-recipients. Perhaps more importantly, the new rules
adapt a version of a return-to-work program that intends to reduce the work disincentives. With the new
rules, individuals on DI receipt are able to keep parts of their DI benefits if annual earnings are greater
than the SGA level (which is approximately $10,000 measured in 2005 dollars), so that increasing labor
supply will always be beneficial. Similar programs have been proposed in many countries, and some
countries have already implemented such programs. In the US, the proposed return-to-work program is
6Based on the initial award rate (not including appeals) of the applicants aged 18-61 years using the Norwegian data of DI
applicants applying for DI benefits between 1998-2003.
7For the US award rates I use the results of Maestas et al. (2013) investigating US DI recipients applying for DI benefits
between 2005-2006.
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known as the “$1 for $2 offset” which reduces benefits with $1 for every $2 of earnings above the SGA
threshold which is quite similar to the Norwegian version.
3 Data
The initial data comes from social security registers and consists of complete records of all individuals
who applied for DI in Norway during the period 1992-2008. It contains all important information
about the applications. That is, whether the application was initially allowed or denied, the degree of
disability8 and also the level of benefits actually achieved.9 The initially denied applicants who reapply
will appear multiple times in the data so that all applications of the respective individuals are observed
in the respective time horizon of interest.
Through unique identifiers for each individual I link the application data with administrative registers
provided by Statistics Norway, using a longitudinal database covering all residents from 1967 to 2010.
The data contains information about individual characteristics such as age, gender, number of children,
years of education and also economic data such as earnings, taxes and public cash transfers. Together
these data create a rich set of longitudinal data for every year that the respective individuals are observed.
One of the main outcome variables I consider is earnings of allowed and rejected applicants. This is
also standard in the literature. I define earnings as labor income plus business income. In addition to this
I also do what is common in the literature, which is making an indicator variable equal to one if earnings
are above the maximum allowed level of earnings for individuals on DI receipt. This threshold is known
as the SGA threshold for those who get full level of benefits, and applies to most applicants.10 This
threshold is set at approximately $10,000 in annual earnings measured in 2005 dollars.11 For those who
do not get full level of benefits (particularly partially disabled applicants), the threshold is calculated as
a function of past earnings.12
The other main outcome I consider is labor supply. In order to measure labor supply I use records
consisting of details about all positions that were registered in Norway during 1992-2010, also provided
8Some recipients are classified as partially disabled and are therefore not eligible for the same amount of benefits as the
totally disabled
9Some applicants get a reduced level of benefits although they are classified as totally disabled. The maximum level of
earnings allowed (the SGA threshold) is different for this group compared to those who get full level of benefits.
10Approximately 65.44% of the full sample of allowed applicants are awarded the full level of DI benefits.
11Specifically, this threshold is set to 1G (the public pension base rate) which was 60,699 NOK in 2005. This becomes
approximately $10,000 by using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6.
12In particular, the threshold is given by: SGA(g) = (1-g)E + 1G where g is the degree of disability (measured from 0 to 1),
E is annual earnings in the year prior to disability onset and 1G is the public pension base rate.
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by Statistics Norway. These records contain information about the exact starting dates and durations
of all positions, and the average working hours per week for each position. By using this information
I measure average working hours per year for each individual, and link this data with the data of DI
applicants through the standard unique identifiers. I define labor force participation as positive working
hours for each year. Thus, the individuals not matched with the labor data are considered to not have
positive working hours in the respective years of interest. In this way, I am are able to investigate labor
supply of DI applicants at the intensive as well as the extensive margin for each year. This is not common
in the literature as data on working hours of DI applicants are often unavailable.
3.1 Sample restrictions
For estimation purposes I consider all individuals who submitted their final DI application during the
years of 1998-2003. Because the temporary benefit-scheme was not yet introduced during these years,
the sample only contains individuals who applied for permanent DI benefits. The final DI application is
defined as the last observed application for DI benefits (if more than one application is observed). Since
all DI applications of the individuals are observed throughout the period 1992-2008, the rejected appli-
cants in the estimation sample did not reapply for DI benefits within 5 years after the final application.
As applicants in the main sample of applicants aged 18-61 years are not observed for more than 5 years
after the final application, the outcomes of the rejected applicants (the control group) can loosely be
interpreted as the behavior of finally rejected applicants. In the years after the final application, the out-
comes of the allowed applicants (the treatment group) can be interpreted as the behavior of all allowed
applicants post the year of their respective DI award decisions.
For both econometric analyses I make use of the same baseline sample, only different age groups.
Particularly, I use the applicants who were of 18-61 years of age by the final application for the upper-
bound analysis, and the applicants who were 62-65 years of age for the analysis of DI recipients being
transferred to the retirement program. Appendix Figure A.2 shows the distribution of age by the final
DI application for the full initial sample of applicants 18-65 years of age. The figure shows that the
majority of applicants are of the upper age-segment.
For both groups I make two notable sample restrictions. Because we are interested in the economic
behavior of the individuals of interest, it would not make sense to take into account the outcomes of
deceased individuals. Therefore, I restrict the sample to those who did not die by the end of the observed
10
sample.13 I also drop those who have been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed
application in the sample of the respective individuals.14 Thus, the characteristics of applicants prior to
the DI award decisions can be interpreted as pre-application characteristics.
Sample of Applicants Aged 18-61 years by the Final DI Application
For the upper-bound analysis I consider applicants that were of 18-61 years of age by the final appli-
cation for DI benefits. The main reason for this age restriction is that Norwegian workers can receive
early retirement benefits at the age of 62, while the individuals younger than 18 years of age are not
eligible for DI benefits. The upper age restriction also ensures that DI beneficiaries are not yet eligible
for retirement benefits during the time horizon of the sample as DI beneficiaries are automatically trans-
ferred to retirement benefits at the age of 67. This amounts to 122,683 applicants that are observed in
the common time horizon of 5 years prior and 5 years post the final DI application. In this way we are
able to observe the behavior of allowed and rejected applicants around the decision of DI receipt, and of
particular interest post the final DI award decision. Using these restrictions, all applicants are observed
within the years of 1993-2008. This leaves us with a balanced sample.
The way of calculating the maximum allowed level of earnings for DI beneficiaries that are not
eligible for the full amount of benefits, requires knowledge about the earnings of applicants in the year
prior to disability onset. This level is not necessarily observable for the particular groups of applicants
in the respective years of interest, as the year of disability onset may be several years prior to the final
application. Luckily, this does not apply to the majority of applicants.15 Therefore, I disregard this
minority of applicants who were not awarded the full amount of DI benefits, and where the maximum
allowed level of earnings was not observed when estimating the fraction of applicants whose earnings
were greater than the SGA threshold.
Sample of Applicants Aged 62-65 years by the Final DI Application
By using the sample of applicants aged 62-65 by the final application I investigate the behavior of DI
recipients when reaching the full retirement age of 67 years. The main reason for the age restriction is
due to the time horizon of the sample. As applicants are only observed until 2010, applicants younger
13Approximately 10.93% of the applicants aged 18-61 years and 14.83% of the applicants aged 62-65 years were observed
as deceased by the end of the sample, that is until 2010.
14This group only amounted to approximately 1.74% of the initial sample.
15Particularly, this applies to approximately 2.38% of the sample of applicants aged 18-61.
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than 62 years by the final application would not be observed for a desired number of years after being
automatically transferred to the retirement program. Restricting the sample to applicants 65 years or
younger by the final application ensures that all recipients participate in the DI program for at least a
year before being transferred to pension benefits. I drop the few applicants that are observed to receive
DI benefits after the age of 67.16
In addition to the joint restrictions of the initial sample, I restrict the sample to those who entered the
retirement program by 2005 (applicants born in 1938 or earlier). The reason why I do this is twofold.
First, the Norwegian government introduced a new return-to-work program for DI beneficiaries in Jan-
uary 2005 which applied to recipients who were awarded DI by the 1st of January 2004 (this would
apply to all the respective recipients of the estimation sample). In addition, the Norwegian government
introduced new rules of earnings restrictions for individuals aged 67-69 years who received pension
benefits in 2008 and 2009. The new rules provide larger work incentives for the particular age group,
and the labor supply of retired individuals eligible for the new rules would not be comparable to the
rest of the sample. In order to keep work incentives and the budget constraints of DI recipients that
are transferred to the retirement program consistent and comparable across different years, I make this
sample restriction.
Because we are interested in the behavior of DI recipients around the years of being transferred
from the DI program to the retirement program, I restrict the sample to the years strictly greater than
the year of the final application for the respective beneficiaries. I also restrict the sample to the allowed
applicants who were awarded the full level of benefits. By doing this, I am able to investigate the
behavior of individuals whose work incentives change identically. The recipients who did not receive
the full amount of DI benefits faced different earnings restrictions, and generally received larger amounts
of pension benefits compared to DI benefits. Thus, the change in work incentives would be different for
this group, and would not have been comparable to the individuals who received the full amount of DI
benefits. The restricted sample used for estimation purposes consists of 11,286 individuals.
3.2 Descriptive evidence
Table 1 displays important characteristics of allowed and rejected applicants for the respective samples
of interest. Because I only consider allowed applicants who were awarded the full level of benefits in
the second analysis, I only show characteristics of this particular group of applicants for the sample of
16This only amounted to approximately 1.08% of the initial sample.
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applicants aged 62-65 years. Note that the characteristics of the allowed applicants for the different
age-groups are not directly comparable, as the sample of applicants aged 18-61 years also includes DI
recipients who were awarded reduced levels of benefits. Unless otherwise is stated, the characteristics
are measured the year before the initial application.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Allowed and Rejected Applicants, Applicants Aged 18-65 by the Final
Decision
Applicants aged 18-61 App. aged 62-65
All applicants Allowed Rejected Allowed
Individuals 122,683 116,036 6,647 11,286
% of full sample 100.00 % 94.58 % 5.42 % 95.14 %
% initially allowed 81.13 % 85.78 % - 94.67 %
% reapplied - allowed 13.45 % 14.22 % - 5.33 %
% reapplied - denied 0.72 % - 13.30 % -
% initially denied - no reapplication 4.70 % - 86.70 % -
Individual Characteristics
Age at final decision 48.57 48.82 44.19 63.59
Female 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.48
Foreign 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.05
Married at final decision 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.73
Children below 18 years of age 0.54 0.52 0.97 0.02
Years of schooling 10.78 10.83 9.80 10.74
Experience 10 years prior 8.36 8.45 6.79 9.61
Avg. earnings 1 year before 25.52 25.88 19.24 41.04
Labor force participation 1 year before 0.57 0.57 0.45 0.75
Hours of work 1 year before 7.10 7.12 6.67 5.38
Type of Disorder
Musculoskeletal disorder 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.46
Mental disorder 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.12
Cardiovascular disorder 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.16
Other disorder 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.26
Notes: Applicants are divided into 2 groups: Those who were allowed DI benefits and those who applied, but were not allowed
DI. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not
observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant.
The sample consists of the Norwegian applicants that were 18-65 years of age and filed their final observed DI application
during the years of 1998-2003, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior
to the initial observed application. For the sample of applicants 62-65 years, only the allowed applicants who received the full
level of benefits, entered the retirement program by 2005 and were observed to receive DI benefits in the year prior to reaching
the retirement age of 67 years are included. Characteristics are measured in the year before the initial DI application unless
otherwise is stated. The types of disorders are based on ICD-10 codes. Labor force participation is defined as working hours
greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are
defined as labor income plus business income.
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The table shows that the majority of applicants are initially allowed DI benefits. Out of those who
are initially denied, most applicants reapply at a later stage. In the main sample of applicants that are
18-61 years of age by the DI award decision, more than two thirds of the initially denied applicants are
observed to eventually get awarded DI benefits. Thus, the award rate when reapplications are taken into
account is much higher than the initial award rate, and is approximately 95% for both samples.
The table also indicates that allowed and rejected applicants aged 18-61 years have different char-
acteristics. This is a potential problem when using rejected applicants as a control group for allowed
applicants, as addressed by Bound (1989). On average the allowed applicants are older, have more years
of schooling and work experience prior to the initial application, have more children below 18 years of
age, are more likely to be born in Norway, have higher pre-application earnings and were more likely
to participate in the labor force prior to the initial decision compared to rejected applicants. Also, the
rejected applicants are more likely to suffer from musculoskeletal disorders.
4 Comparing Allowed and Rejected Applicants using Propensity Score-
Matching
Since Bound (1989) first suggested using rejected applicants as a control group for allowed applicants,
it has not been clear whether rejected applicants accurately measure the potential outcomes such as
earnings and labor supply of DI beneficiaries. Bound argued that rejected applicants are healthier and
therefore more capable of work than allowed applicants, and thus have higher potential earnings and
labor supply. However, it is not clear that this have to be the case. An objection to Bound’s method,
as he also addresses, is that other factors than health may account for low levels of earnings and labor
supply of rejected applicants. Although rejected applicants may be healthier, they also may differ in
other important characteristics such as ability, motivation and education.
Table 1 shows evidence that this also is the case for the Norwegian applicants aged 18-61 years.
Among others, rejected applicants are less educated, have less work experience and are more likely to
be foreign than allowed applicants. The fact that rejected applicants have lower pre-application earnings
also indicate that they may have lower earnings potential. As such, it is not clear whether rejected
applicants understate or overstate the potential earnings and labor supply of allowed applicants.
To address these issues, I use a method based on the approach of Singleton (2012), who reweights
the pool of rejected applicants and controls for differences in observable pre-application characteris-
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tics between allowed and rejected applicants. The estimates of the reweighted applicants can then be
interpreted as the potential outcomes of rejected applicants if they were to have the same observable
characteristics as allowed applicants. Under some assumptions, the reweighted applicants can also be
used to measure potential outcomes of allowed applicants if they had been rejected, and detect the treat-
ment effects of DI award.
4.1 Research Design
The differences in observable characteristics between allowed and rejected applicants suggest that re-
jected applicants are not directly comparable to allowed applicants. To address this issue, I use a propen-
sity score-based weight in order to reweight the pool of rejected applicants. The weights are positively
related with benefit award, and are estimated using a logit model where DI award at the final application
is the dependent variable.17 The control variables are only based on fixed pre-application characteristics
in order to avoid endogenous controls. The results of the logit reveal that the likelihood of award is
decreasing in age until around 30 years of age, but from then on increases. It also increases in past earn-
ings, increases in years of schooling, decreases if foreign (not born in Norway) and increases if female.
For more information about the logit and the results of the model, see Appendix Table A.1.
Based on specific assumptions, the logit predicts the probability of benefit award conditional on
individual characteristics such as age, gender, educational attainment and past earnings. These individual
probabilities can then be used to estimate the counterfactual outcomes of allowed applicants if they had
been rejected. If there are no further differences between allowed and rejected applicants affecting the
probability of disability award, and in particular of observable as well as unobservable differences in the
health conditions of applicants, then the counterfactual outcomes of an allowed applicant is given by:
E[Y 0it |Ai = 1] = E[w(xi)Yit |Ai = 0] (1)
Where Y 0it is the potential outcome (such as earnings or labor force participation) of applicant i in period
17Controls for the model are Age, its square, Female, Foreign (not born in Norway), years of schooling prior to initial
application, its square, years of work experience 10 years prior to the initial decision, its square, being married, number of
children below 18 years of age, degree of disability indicators (totally disabled, partially disabled or missing degree indicator),
an indicator for receiving social assistance, an indicator for reapplying, number of reapplications, its square, years between
initial and final application, its square, state fixed effects and diagnostic code fixed effects. To control for earnings and labor
supply, I constructed 5 quantiles indicating the earnings of applicants and hours of work quantiles indicating days of work per
week in the year prior to the initial application. In addition I allow for a linear time trend and several interaction variables (for
details about the estimates of the logit model, see Appendix Table A.1).
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t if rejected. The left side thus represents the counterfactual outcome of allowed applicants, and the right
side is the reweighting estimator using a propensity score weight w(xi). The propensity score weight is
as follows:
w(xi) =
1−pi
pi
P(Ai = 1|x)
1−P(Ai = 1|x) (2)
Where pi = P(A = 1) is the share of finally allowed applicants over the whole sample, P(Ai = 1|x)
is the probability of being allowed conditional on controls for each individual i, and is estimated by
the logit model of DI award. The weights, and therefore the estimated potential outcomes of allowed
applicants are increasing in the estimated likelihood of disability award. Because the probability of
award necessarily has to be higher if a larger part of the sample is allowed DI benefits, the weights are
adjusted with the observed sample likelihood of award. Hence, the weights can be interpreted as the
respective potential outcomes of allowed applicants relative to the rejected applicants under the initial
assumptions of the model.
However, there may be differences in observables as well as unobservables that violate these as-
sumptions, and particularly differences in health of allowed and rejected applicants. Since I do not have
qualified data to measure health, the estimated outcomes of the reweighted applicants then may serve
as biased estimates of the potential outcomes of allowed applicants. There are, however, reasons to
believe that allowed applicants are hit by a larger health shock than rejected applicants, and thus have
worse health after the application decision.18 If this is the case, the weighted applicants could potentially
overestimate the potential outcomes of allowed applicants. In particular:
E[Y 0it |Ai = 1]≤ E[w(xi)Yit |Ai = 0] (3)
Under this assumption, the estimated outcomes of weighted applicants can be treated as upper-bound
estimates. Subtracting the observed outcomes of allowed applicants will then give us upper-bound
estimates of the treatment effect, that is, the effect of DI award. In particular, the treatment effect
can be expressed as:
TreatmentE f f ectt ≤ E[w(xi)Yit |Ai = 0]−E[Y 1it |Ai = 1] (4)
In addition, this approach makes us able to investigate Bound’s initial hypothesis of using rejected
18Based on the assumption of Bound (1989), who argued that rejected applicants are healthier than allowed applicants.
16
applicants as a control group for allowed applicants, as we can compare the weighted estimates with
the observed outcomes of rejected applicants. If the estimated outcomes of the weighted applicants are
smaller than or equal to the observed outcomes of the rejected applicants, then there is strong evidence
that rejected applicants serve as a desirable control group interpreting the estimated outcomes as upper-
bound estimates. Under the assumptions of the model, Bound’s hypothesis can be expressed by the
following:
E[Y 0it |Ai = 0] = E[Yit |Ai = 0]≥ E[w(xi)Yit |Ai = 0] (5)
Important to note, is that larger estimates for the rejected applicants once weighted compared to the
observed rejected applicants do not necessarily imply that the potential outcomes of allowed applicants
are larger than those of rejected applicants, under the assumptions of the model. As allowed applicants
may have worse health, their true potential outcomes could be lower than the weighted estimates. This
bias may then dominate the difference between the weighted estimates and the outcomes of the rejected
applicants. On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility of allowed applicants having higher
potential outcomes than rejected applicants because of differences in characteristics. In this sense, com-
paring the rejected applicants once weighted with the observed rejected applicants only serves as an
upper-bound test of rejected applicants as a control group for allowed applicants.
4.2 Results
I begin my presentation of results by providing graphical evidence of economic outcomes of allowed
and rejected applicants along with the rejected applicants once weighted around the year of the final DI
award decision. This makes us able to compare the behavior of the respective applicants, and also gives
us an indication of the estimated upper-bound treatment effects. Importantly, we also get a picture of
whether rejected applicants serve as a desirable control group for allowed applicants.
Figure 1 displays the patterns of earnings, weekly working hours, earnings above the SGA threshold
(the fraction of applicants having earnings greater than the level of substantial gainful activity), and labor
force participation (the fraction of applicants with working hours greater than zero) for the full sample
of 122,683 applicants aged 18-61 years. Since all applicants are observed for all years of interest, the
figures should give us a correct indication of the average behavior of applicants with respect to the
economic outcomes. Appendix Figure A.3 shows the public transfers and DI benefits during the same
years, indicating a significant increase in such transfers for allowed applicants around the year of DI
17
award. This figure also confirms that the allowed applicants indeed do get DI benefits in the application
year, while the rejected applicants do not.
Figure 1: Economic Outcomes of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 18-61 by Final Decision,
Before and After Final Decision
(a) Earnings ($1,000)
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Notes: The figures show the behavior of allowed, rejected and the estimated rejected applicants once weighted around the year
of the final DI award decision. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed
for each individual. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an
applicant is not observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a
rejected applicant. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years
of 1998-2003 and were of 18-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive
DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero.
Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income
plus business income.
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The first thing to note is the remarkably similar outcomes of the rejected applicants once weighted
compared to allowed applicants prior to the year of DI award. Because allowed applicants should be
relatively unaffected by the DI award decision in the years prior to the application, the weighted esti-
mates should be around the same. However, the figures suggest there may be a small treatment effect
in the year prior to the decision. This could represent a smoothing-effect as the applicants may take
into account the possibility of DI award. On the other hand, it could also represent declining health of
allowed applicants relative to rejected applicants prior to the application year. Under the assumption
of equation 3, the potential earnings and labor supply of allowed applicants could be smaller than the
weighted estimates of rejected applicants.
In the years post the final allowance decision, the patterns of earnings and labor supply of allowed
applicants appear to remain fairly stable after dropping in the years around the decision. This is in stark
contrast with the patterns of rejected applicants whose earnings and labor supply indicate increasing
trends. Also, the estimated outcomes of the rejected applicants once weighted follow similar patterns as
those of the observed rejected applicants. However, the estimated outcomes appear to be consistently
larger than those of the rejected applicants. As it seems, we cannot rule out the possibility of allowed
applicants having greater potential earnings and labor supply than rejected applicants.
I now turn to the quantitative analysis of the treatment effects as well as the analysis of rejected
applicants as a control group for allowed applicants. Table 2 displays the estimated difference between
the economic outcomes of allowed and rejected applicants once weighted (the estimated upper-bound
treatment effect) and the difference between the rejected applicants and the estimated outcomes of the
weighted rejected applicants, respectively. The outcome variables considered are the same as those of
Figure 1 (earnings, weekly working hours, earnings above the SGA threshold and labor force partici-
pation). In order to get an impression of how these effects evolve in the years post the DI decision, I
include estimates 1, 3 and 5 years after the final decision. In addition, I include estimates of the differ-
ences between allowed and rejected applicants once weighted in the year prior to the decision. These
estimates give us an indication of whether there may be a treatment effect prior to the decision.
In order to get correct indications of the standard errors, I estimate bootstrap standard errors using
500 replications. This approach ensures that the stochastic component of the estimated probabilities
are taken into account when calculating the standard errors. More generally, the differences between
allowed and weighted rejected applicants indicate the estimated (upper-bound) average treatment effect
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of the treated (ATT). In this particular case, the standard errors would be upward biased if we did not
take into account that the estimated probabilities were stochastic. The same is true considering the
estimated differences between the rejected applicants and the weighted rejected applicants. Obviously,
the estimated outcomes of the weighted rejected applicants are positively related with the observed
outcomes of the rejected applicants. Taking this into account give reduced standard errors compared to
the case of calculating standard errors only based on differences in means. Because of this, the bootstrap
standard errors are not only more correct, but also conduce more precision.
Table 2: Upper-Bound and Control Group of Rejected Applicants Estimates, Applicants Aged 18-61
Years by the Final Decision
1 year pre 1 year post 3 years post 5 years post
final decision final decision final decision final decision
Difference between:
Allowed & Weighted ! ! ! !
Rejected & Weighted ! ! !
Outcomes:
Earnings -2.64*** -16.43*** -5.28*** -18.70*** -3.12*** -19.37*** -1.82***
(0.704) (0.660) (0.563) (0.616) (0.537) (0.667) (0.573)
Working Hours -1.37*** -5.76*** -1.72*** -8.01*** -0.97*** -9.42*** -0.19
(0.315) (0.374) (0.319) (0.369) (0.292) (0.394) (0.313)
Earn > SGA -0.06*** -0.59*** -0.11*** -0.57*** -0.04*** -0.55*** -0.02*
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Labor Force -0.05*** -0.21*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.24*** -0.05***
Participation (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Observations 122,683 122,683 13,294 122,683 13,294 122,683 13,294
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level. All estimates report bootstrap standard errors
using 500 replications.
Notes: The table displays the differences in means between the estimated outcomes of weighted applicants and the allowed
and rejected applicants, respectively. The estimates are shown for the respective years relative to the final DI award decision of
applicants. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed for each individual. An
applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed
to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The
sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years of 1998-2003 and were
of 18-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial
observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005
dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income plus business income.
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The estimated upper-bound treatment effects are all significant at the 1% level, and indicate that
allowed applicants may exhibit additional earnings and labor supply potentials. However, these esti-
mates do not prove that the treatment effects are significantly greater than zero under the assumption
of equation 3. What the estimates do tell us, are that the earnings of individuals on DI receipt at most
would have been approximately $16,430, $18,700 and $19,370 greater if they had not been awarded DI
benefits 1, 3 and 5 years after the final decision, respectively. Also, the estimates indicate that labor
force participation rate of allowed applicants at most would have been 20-25 percentage points higher if
they had not been awarded DI benefits. As predicted, the estimates confirm that there may be apparent
treatment effects in the year prior to the decision. Considering earnings, working hours and labor force
participation, the estimates suggest that the treatment effects may be increasing in time post the deci-
sion. This should come as no surprise as rejected applicants indicate upward sloping trends post the final
decision. This may be a result of rejected applicants getting healthier, but could also indicate greater
responsiveness to economic incentives in the longer run.
The estimates also confirm that the outcomes of the rejected applicants once weighted in general
are significantly different from those of the observed rejected applicants. Because the outcomes of the
weighted rejected applicants are greater than those of the rejected applicants, allowed applicants may
exhibit greater earnings and labor supply potentials compared to rejected applicants. In other words,
the hypothesis of Bound (1989) may be violated for the Norwegian applicants. However, the estimated
differences tend to decrease with years after the final DI decision, and the estimated differences are not
significant at the 5% level 5 years after the decision considering working hours and earnings above the
SGA threshold. This finding may indicate that using rejected applicants as a control group for allowed
applicants works better some years after the final allowance decision.
4.3 Heterogeneity
Figure 1 demonstrated the behavior of allowed and rejected applicants around the year of the final DI
award decision. However, there are reasons to believe that the effects of interest are different for different
types of applicants. Particularly, I investigate whether the effects are heterogeneous with respect to age
and the degree of disability. Getting a better understanding of heterogeneity in age makes us better
equipped to compare these effects with the effects of older beneficiaries in the second analysis.
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4.3.1 Applicants Aged 18-39 Years by the Final DI award Decision
Figure 2 reports the exact same outcomes as those of the full sample, but restricting the sample to
applicants aged 18-39 years by the final decision. Table estimates of the upper-bound treatment effects
and the estimated differences between the weighted rejected applicants and the rejected applicants are
shown in Appendix Table A.2.
Figure 2: Economic Outcomes of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 18-39 by Final Decision,
Before and After DI Decision
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(d) Labor Force Participation
Notes: The figures show the behavior of allowed, rejected and the estimated rejected applicants once weighted around the year
of the final DI award decision. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed
for each individual. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an
applicant is not observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a
rejected applicant. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years
of 1998-2003 and were of 18-39 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive
DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero.
Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income
plus business income.
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The outcomes of this particular group of applicants are very different from those of the full sample.
The first thing to note, is that the pre-trends of allowed and rejected applicants are nearly identical.
In fact, the outcomes of rejected applicants are slightly greater than those of the allowed applicants,
completely different from the full sample of applicants. Also, the outcomes of the weighted rejected
applicants are almost identical to those of the observed rejected applicants, and none are significant at
the 10% level. Under the assumptions of the model, these estimates suggest that rejected applicants
could be a desirable control group when only considering applicants 18-39 years. In addition,
The estimates of Appendix Table A.2 indicate that the upper-bound treatment effects are similar to
those of the full sample, but to a greater extent increase in years after the final DI award decision. 1 year
post the decision, the estimated upper-bound treatment effect of labor force participation is 16%, but
increases to 26% after 5 years. These findings suggest a greater responsiveness of younger applicants
to not being awarded benefits in the longer run. This could be a result of increasing health of rejected
applicants, but it could also represent a greater responsiveness to economic incentives of younger appli-
cants. As younger applicants benefit from reentry to the labor force over a longer period of time, they
face greater incentives of work than older applicants. In addition, they are likely to have fewer options
to replace lost income than older applicants, and may also face smaller losses in human capital, which
may induce a larger share of younger applicants to work.
4.3.2 Applicants Aged 40-61 Years by the Final DI award Decision
Figure 3 reports the estimated outcomes of the sample of applicants aged 40-61 years by the final de-
cision. Table estimates of the upper-bound treatment effects and the estimated differences between the
weighted rejected applicants and the rejected applicants are shown in Appendix Table A.3.
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Figure 3: Economic Outcomes of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 40-61 by Final Decision,
Before and After DI Decision
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Notes: The figures show the behavior of allowed, rejected and the estimated rejected applicants once weighted around the year
of the final DI award decision. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed
for each individual. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an
applicant is not observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a
rejected applicant. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years
of 1998-2003 and were of 40-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive
DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero.
Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income
plus business income.
These outcomes are much like the outcomes of Figure 1 which uses the full sample of applicants.
Also, the table estimates of the upper-bound treatment effects are quite similar to those of the full sam-
ple. This should come as no surprise as most applicants in the full sample are in this age segment.19
However, the differences between the outcomes of the weighted rejected applicants and the observed
19More precisely, applicants aged 40-61 years by the final decision amount to approximately 80% of the sample.
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rejected applicants appear to be somewhat greater in this subsample. This is also evident in Appendix
Table A.3 as all but one of these estimates are significant at the 1% level. The differences appear to
be quite consistent over time. The pre-decision outcomes of particularly earnings, earnings above the
SGA threshold and labor force participation appear to be more different between allowed and rejected
applicants compared to the full sample. More specifically, pre-application differences in observable
characteristics between allowed and rejected applicants appear to be an even bigger issue when consid-
ering the sample of applicants 40-61 years. Together with the results of applicants aged 18-39 years,
these estimates indicate that rejected applicants work much better as a control group if pre-application
characteristics are not too different, as one would expect. This statement backs up the arguments of
Bound (1989).
The rejected applicants do not show the same responsiveness to not being awarded DI benefits as the
applicants aged 18-39 years in the longer run. This may indicate a lower degree of response to economic
incentives of older applicants. As it appears, most of the long run-response to not being awarded DI
benefits in the main sample can be attributed to younger applicants.
4.3.3 Totally Disabled Applicants Aged 18-61 Years by the Final DI award Decision
Figure 4 displays the estimated outcomes of the sample of applicants classified as totally disabled (ap-
plicants who are eligible for the full amount of DI benefits) and aged 18-61 years by the final decision.
Table estimates of the upper-bound treatment effects and the estimated differences between the outcomes
of the rejected applicants once weighted and the observed outcomes of the rejected applicants are shown
in Appendix Table A.4.
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Figure 4: Economic Outcomes of Totally Disabled Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 18-61 by
Final Decision, Before and After DI Decision
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Notes: The figures show the behavior of allowed, rejected and the estimated rejected applicants once weighted around the year
of the final DI award decision. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed
for each individual. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an
applicant is not observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a
rejected applicant. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants classified as totally disabled that filed their final observed DI
application during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 18-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample (by 2010) and
have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as
working hours greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK =
6, and are defined as labor income plus business income.
The outcomes are similar to those of the full sample, and particularly the pre-decision trends of
allowed and rejected applicants. For this subsample, rejected applicants appear to work quite well
as a control group considering the upper-bound treatment effects. According to the table estimates
of Appendix Table A.4, none of the estimates of the differences in outcomes between the weighted
estimates and the rejected applicants are significantly smaller than zero when considering outcomes 3
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and 5 years post the decision. In fact, the patterns of the rejected applicants once weighted appear to be
much more stable than those of the observed rejected applicants, and consistent with the patterns of the
allowed applicants.
The outcomes of the rejected applicants increase consistently more steeply in the years after the
final decision compared to the full sample. Also, the estimates of the upper-bound treatment effects are
greater than those of the full sample. Particularly, the estimates suggest that labor force participation
at most would have been 26%, 28% and 30% greater if the totally disabled applicants would not have
been awarded DI benefits. These findings give no indications of totally disabled applicants responding
less to economic incentives than partially disabled applicants. However, it could be that the totally
disabled allowed applicants are hit by larger health shocks than partially disabled applicants, and that
these estimates give false indications of larger treatment effects of totally disabled applicants. These
estimates are, after all, upper-bound estimates under the assumption of the model. Nonetheless, the
greater responsiveness of rejected applicants may indicate that even the applicants classified as totally
disabled exhibit considerable potential earnings and labor supply.
5 Behavior of DI recipients around Full Retirement Age
In Norway, DI beneficiaries are automatically transferred from the DI program to the retirement program
at the age of 67. This is also evident in Appendix Figure A.4 as the full restricted sample of allowed
applicants aged 62-65 years stop receiving DI benefits at the age of 67. The level of benefits that the
individuals receive, however, does in general not change because of this transition. Importantly, the
work incentives of the prior beneficiaries change substantially as they no longer face the same earnings
restrictions implied by the DI program. In this way, this transition allows us to find out about whether
individuals on DI receipt exhibit additional earnings and labor supply potentials, and to what extent the
earnings restrictions implied by the DI program provide work disincentive effects.
5.1 Background
An important feature of the Norwegian welfare system, is that individuals are eligible for the same
amount of DI benefits and retirement benefits. Thus, the level of public transfers received should in
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general not change as the DI recipients are transferred to the retirement program.20 Appendix Figure A.4
shows evidence of public transfers being quite stable at the same level before and after the transition (the
minor increase is due to the fact that some DI recipients have earnings levels above the SGA threshold,
and get a reduced level of benefits). However, the participants of the respective programs face very
different earnings restrictions, which determine the levels of benefits actually received. This creates a
major difference in the work incentives of the two programs.
Figure 5 shows the budget constraint of a typical DI recipient as he is transferred to retirement ben-
efits.21 The line AFG (slope equal to one) applies in the absence of any DI or retirement program. If
the individual does not receive any benefits, total income equals earnings. For a DI recipient receiving
the full level of benefits, the budget constraint is given by BCDEFG. Benefits are provided in full at the
budget segment BC. If earnings are greater than the SGA threshold of $10,000 in annual earnings, bene-
fits are phased out at a rate of approximately $0.6 for every $1 in earnings. This leads to a discontinuous
reduction in DI benefits, and creates the notch in the budget constraint represented by the line CD. The
individual becomes ineligible for DI benefits if annual earnings are greater than approximately $32,000,
creating the second notch represented by EF. These discontinuous reductions in DI benefits then may
incentivize DI beneficiaries to reduce earnings and/or labor supply compared to what they would have
done in the absence of the earnings restrictions.
When the DI recipient is transferred to the retirement program, the budget constraint changes to BHI
given that the pension benefits are the same as the benefits received on the DI program. At $20,000
in annual earnings, retirement benefits are phased out at a rate of approximately $0.4 for every $1 in
earnings, but only for earnings above this level. However, the main work disincentive effects of the
DI program disappear. When the individuals turn 70, the budget constraint becomes BHJ as retirement
benefits are no longer phased out when annual earnings are greater than $20,000.
20Provided that the individuals receive the full amount of DI benefits, and does not have earnings levels above the SGA
threshold.
21Because the budget constraint of DI recipients depends on the amount of benefits received, the budget constraint will
look different for recipients receiving different amounts of benefits. Therefore, I show the budget constraint for a DI recipient
receiving the average level of benefits. Importantly, the level of earnings that leads to a reduction in DI benefits, is the same
for all beneficiaries (the SGA threshold).
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Figure 5: Budget Constraint
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Notes: The black solid line represents the set of earnings and total gross income for a typical DI recipient who were awarded
the full level of benefits during the years of 1998-2003, and were 62-65 years of age by the final DI award decision. The red
lines represent how the budget constraint changes as the the DI recipients are transferred to the retirement program, keeping the
baseline level of benefits constant. For simplicity, the figure disregards income taxation and dependent benefits. Total annual
gross income thus represents earnings plus DI benefits. Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000.
This change in work incentives is similar to the recently introduced rules of the Norwegian DI
program (and also the proposed “$1 for $2 offset” program in the US), which also eliminates the first
notch in the budget constraint. Thus, the responsiveness of retired beneficiaries could give us some
indications of the effects of the new rules of the Norwegian DI program. However, the effects are
not directly comparable as there most likely would be significant differences in the responsiveness of
individuals on DI receipt and retired beneficiaries. Furthermore, the retired DI beneficiaries face even
stronger work incentives in terms of total income as the retirement benefits are not phased out in the
same way as earnings increase.
The change in the budget constraint of individuals thus creates a discontinuous change in work
incentives for the individuals when turning 67 years, but keeping the level of benefits constant. However,
it is not clear whether the DI recipients who participate in the labor force prior to the transition will
change their behavior when reaching the retirement age of 67 years. First, the individuals get older
when they are transferred to the retirement program, and it is reasonable to assume that their work
capacity decline with age around these years. Also, there may be some DI recipients participating in the
labor force prior to the transition who retire from work at the age of 67 (as the majority of individuals
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not on DI do). In addition, individuals may face difficulties participating in the labor force after the
transition, as some enterprises allow for the possibility of dismissing employees when turning 67 years
of age. However, most enterprises operate with an age restriction of 70 years before employees can
be dismissed. In Norway, there is no employment protection for individuals above 70 years of age. In
light of the improved work incentives after individuals turn 70 years (as retirement benefits are no longer
phased out when annual earnings exceed $20,000), this leaves an ambiguous effect on earnings and labor
supply after individuals turn 70 years.
Differences in the tax schemes of the respective programs could also potentially affect the work
incentives of individuals, and bias the estimated effects of DI recipients being transferred to the retire-
ment program. However, the individuals on DI receipt face similar tax deductions as those on retirement
benefits, and both groups also face lower tax rates on labor income compared to individuals not on DI.
Thus, the taxation on labor income for individuals should not affect the behavior of the individuals by
too much.
5.2 Bunching
Because individuals on DI receipt face incentives to keep the level of earnings below the SGA threshold
of $10,000, some recipients may “bunch” below this level. Figure 6 shows the earnings distributions
of DI recipients in the years prior to being transferred to retirement benefits and in the years after the
transition, respectively. For simplicity, only the individuals with positive levels of working hours and
earnings are included, and only earnings levels between $0 and $20,000 are being shown.
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Figure 6: Earnings Distributions of DI Recipients Before and After being Transferred to the Retirement
Program, All Years
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Notes: The figures show the earnings distributions of the respective age-groups of DI recipients as they are transferred to
retirement benefits at the age of 67. Only individuals with positive levels of earnings and a positive level of working hours are
included. The green lines report Kernel densities using a bandwidth of 1.6. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that
were awarded the full level of DI benefits during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 62-65 years of age, entered the retirement
program by 2005, received DI benefits in the year prior to being transferred to retirement benefits, did not die by the end of
the sample (by 2010) and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Earnings
are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income plus
business income.
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Figure a) displays the earnings distribution of the individuals on DI receipt post the final decision,
and shows that there appears to be excessive mass in the segment just below the SGA threshold. Consid-
ering the mass above the indicated frequency of the Kernel density in the earnings segment of $8,000 -
$10,000, the estimated excessive mass is around 5%, indicating that around 5% of the individuals with a
positive labor supply and earnings reduce earnings and/or labor supply in order to keep the full amount
of DI benefits. In addition, there may be individuals on DI receipt not working because of the earnings
restrictions, but would have done so in the absence of the restrictions.
This bunching behavior is no longer evident when the recipients reach the full retirement age, and are
no longer bound by the SGA threshold as displayed in Figure b). Importantly, there is clear evidence of
increased mass in the segment $10,000 - $20,000. This suggests that some of the individuals who were
bound by the earnings restrictions prior to the transition increase earnings when receiving retirement
benefits, as the SGA restriction no longer applies.
The behavior becomes even more evident when considering the earnings distributions of those in
Appendix Figure A.5, which reports the earnings distributions for each year of the respective ages of
individuals. The bunching behavior below the SGA threshold is clearly evident before the transition
(when individuals are 65 and 66 years of age). When the DI recipients are transferred to the retirement
program at the age of 67 years, there is little evidence of such behavior (considering the earnings distri-
bution of retired DI beneficiaries aged 67 and 68 years). One can also see that the mass in the segment
$10,000 - $20,000 clearly increases in these years.
5.3 Graphical Evidence
Figure 7 provides a descriptive look at the behavior of DI recipients when reaching the retirement age,
displaying economic outcomes before and after the transition. Graph a) shows annual earnings, graph
b) displays average working hours per week, graph c) shows the fraction of individuals whose earnings
are greater than the SGA threshold, and the fraction of individuals with working hours greater than zero
is displayed in graph d). Prior to reaching the retirement age, only the years strictly greater than the year
of the final application for each allowed applicant are included. Thus, the economic outcomes displayed
in the figure can be interpreted as the average behavior of the respective sample of individuals on DI
receipt being transferred to the retirement program.
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Figure 7: Economic Outcomes of Allowed Applicants Aged 62-65 by Final Decision, Before and After
Year of Retirement
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Notes: The figures show economic outcomes of individuals on DI receipt around the years of being automatically transferred
to retirement benefits at the age of 67. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that were awarded the full level of DI
benefits during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 62-65 years of age, entered the retirement program by 2005, received DI
benefits in the year prior to being transferred to retirement benefits, did not die by the end of the sample (by 2010) and have not
been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working
hours greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and
are defined as labor income plus business income.
Figure a) indicates a downward sloping trend in the earnings of DI recipients prior to the transition.
However, the trend does not continue to slope downwards after the transition, suggesting that some
recipients may respond to the improved work incentives. Figure c) shows a significant jump in the
fraction of DI recipients whose earnings are greater than the SGA threshold as the DI recipients reach
the full retirement age. This is consistent with the findings of the bunching analysis, and confirms that
a certain fraction of individuals increase earnings when the earnings restrictions no longer apply. In the
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years prior to the transition, the fraction of recipients above the SGA threshold is quite stable around
2%. In the year of when recipients turn 67 years, the fraction of individuals whose earnings are greater
than the SGA threshold jumps to approximately 3.3%. The fraction increases to approximately 4% of all
individuals as the individuals turn 68 and 69 years, respectively. As individuals turn 67 years at different
points of time in the year of when they retire, it is not completely clear how the earnings restrictions
apply in the year of retirement. Because of this, some individuals may still have incentives to reduce
earnings compared to their optimal level in this particular year, explaining why the fraction jumps once
more as the individuals turn 68.
These findings suggest heterogeneous responsiveness of recipients to the transition. Although the
trend in average earnings of individuals is non-increasing, the increase in the fraction of individuals
above the SGA threshold suggests that some individuals respond to the work incentives, and increase
earnings and/or labor supply. This fact also supports the hypothesis of an underlying downward-sloping
trend in earnings if the work incentives remained unchanged. Assuming that the fraction of recipients
above the SGA threshold would have remained at 2% if the earnings restrictions still applied to the
individuals above 67 years of age, these findings suggest that approximately 2% of recipients aged 63-
66 years reduce earnings (and potentially labor supply) when on DI receipt because of the earnings
restrictions. In addition, there may be individuals whose earnings were above the SGA threshold prior
to retirement, but below the threshold in the year of turning 67 years. The fraction of recipients who
exhibit additional earnings potentials then may exceed 2%.
The observed levels of working hours and labor force participation tell us a different story of the
behavior of the individuals. Considering figure b), the trend in working hours appears to be upward
sloping prior to the decision, but seems to be fairly flat after the decision. This pattern is not consistent
with the trends in earnings, but may have alternative explanations. First, individuals may have higher
wages on average before the transition. Since earnings are defined as labor income plus business income,
individuals may also have higher levels of business income prior to the transition on average. Another
explanation could be errors in the data. As the data on working hours refer to reported working hours of
employers, individuals on DI receipt may have incentives to misreport work activity in order to keep the
full amount of DI benefits.
Figure d) shows a similar pattern of labor force participation as the level of working hours, and
suggest that around 7-8% of the DI recipients have a positive labor supply prior to the transition. Post
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the transition, there appears to be a downward sloping trend in the fraction of individuals with a positive
labor supply. This may indicate that the “retirement effects” (some of the individuals with a positive
labor supply prior to the transition may voluntary retire at the age of 67, and some individuals may
face difficulties participating in the labor force when being older than 67 years) dominate the effects of
the improved work incentives when considering labor supply at the extensive margin. Taking the labor
force participation-rate into account, average working hours of the individuals are strictly increasing as
the individuals are transferred to the retirement program. This may indicate that most of the response
to the improved work incentives is due to individuals increasing labor supply at the intensive margin.
Despite the ambiguous effects on labor supply, there is no clear evidence of individuals increasing labor
supply at the extensive margin because of the improved work incentives considering these findings.
5.4 Estimation
The change in work incentives when DI recipients reach the retirement age of 67 years suggest that some
recipients may increase earnings and/or labor supply post the transition. In order to estimate the effects
of the improved work incentives, I consider a standard panel-data regression model trying to capture an
underlying age-effect. Motivated by the relatively linear pre-trends in Figure 7, I estimate a regression
model of the following form:
Yit = α+Ageitβ+
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∑
t=67
Dtγt +ui+ εit (6)
Where Yit denotes the outcome variable (earnings, weekly working hours, earnings above the SGA
threshold or labor force participation) for individual i between time period t−1 and t, Ageit denotes the
age of individual i between time period t−1 and t, Dt denote indicators for each year of the changed work
incentives, ui denotes an individual-specific constant term and εit is an individual-specific error term for
each time period t. Thus, β is the effect of a one unit increase in age, and captures the underlying linear
age-effect of DI recipients prior to the transition. The coefficients γt denote the estimated effects for
each year of DI recipients being transferred to retirement benefits (when age is being held constant), and
thus face different work incentives.
The model specification implicitly assumes that the age-effects prior to the transition would have
remained constant if there were no changes in work incentives. This assumption may be violated for
several reasons (discussed below), and should be kept in mind when considering the results of this
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model. The assumption seems more reasonable considering the fraction of individuals above the SGA
threshold as the outcome variable, as the pre-trend in Figure 7 appears to be quite straight and stable.
Considering working hours and labor force participation as the outcome variables, the assumption may
not be as reliable as the pre-trends are upward sloping. As mentioned earlier, there may be some issues
with these trends. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the estimates of the model.
The assumption of a constant age-effect will be violated if the underlying age-trends are not lin-
ear. Also, the “retirement effects” may imply that the underlying trends are not continuous around the
particular year of transition. As some individuals may retire from work at the age of 67, and some indi-
viduals may face difficulties participating in the labor force after turning 67 years of age, the coefficient
estimates of the D′ts then may underestimate the effects of the improved work incentives. Thus, if in-
terpreting the D′ts as the effects of the improved work incentives for each year, the coefficient estimates
can be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of the improved work incentives under the assumptions of
the model.
With this standard panel-data set-up, I allow for the possibility of individuals having different levels
of potential earnings and labor supply. Particularly, this is captured by the individual-specific constant
term ui. Under this hypothesis, OLS will in general provide inefficient estimates of the coefficients of
interest because of the correlation between ui and εit . If there is correlation between the individual-
specific term ui and age (or the indicator variables), the OLS estimates will also be biased. I allow for
these correlations to be nonzero, and estimate the regression model using fixed-effects.
5.4.1 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the FE regression model represented in equation 6 for the full restricted
sample of DI recipients being 62-65 years of age by the final application. I consider the same outcome
variables as those represented in Figure 7. That is earnings, weekly working hours, earnings above the
SGA threshold (the fraction of applicants having earnings greater than the level of substantial gainful
activity), and labor force participation (the fraction of applicants with working hours greater than zero).
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Table 3: FE Regression Model
Labor Force
Earnings Working Hours Earn > SGA Participation
Constant 10.48*** -3.31** 0.048 0.190**
(1,427) (1.341) (0.067) (0.092)
Age -0.14*** 0.06*** -0.000 -0.002
(0.022) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001)
Age dummies:
D67 0.02 -0.08** 0.012*** -0.004*
(0.047) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002)
D68 0.19*** -0.15*** 0.018*** -0.004
(0.066) (0.056) (0.003) (0.004)
D69 0.32*** -0.24*** 0.018*** -0.008
(0.091) (0.077) (0.004) (0.005)
D70 0.42*** -0.27*** 0.015*** -0.006
(0.112) (0.098) (0.005) (0.007)
D71 0.47*** -0.36*** 0.011* -0.009
(0.133) (0.119) (0.006) (0.008)
D72 0.48*** -0.43*** 0.005 -0.009
(0.154) (0.140) (0.007) (0.009)
R2 0.0016 0.0002 0.0016 0.0003
Observations 94,889 94,889 94,869 94,889
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level.
Notes: The table show the results of the regression model represented in equation 6 for the full restricted sample of DI recipients
62-65 years of age. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that were awarded the full level of DI benefits during the
years of 1998-2003 and were of 62-65 years of age, entered the retirement program by 2005, received DI benefits in the year
prior to being transferred to retirement benefits, did not die by the end of the sample (by 2010) and have not been observed to
receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than
zero. Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor
income plus business income.
The results reveal, among other, some evidence of increased earnings of DI recipients being trans-
ferred to retirement benefits under the assumptions of the model. Note that the standard errors increase
as the years after the transition increase, indicating more uncertainty about the impact of the improved
work incentives in the longer run. Considering earnings as the outcome variable, the estimated coef-
ficient on the underlying age-trend implies that the earnings of recipients decrease with approximately
$140 for each year because of recipients getting older. All the estimated coefficients on the indicator
variables of being transferred to pension benefits are positive. This may indicate that the effects of the
improved work incentives dominate the “retirement effects”. However, there is no clear evidence of
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response to the improved work incentives of retired beneficiaries when turning 70 years, as retirement
benefits are no longer phased out for annual earnings levels above $20,000. This also may be due to
negated employment protection when individuals turn 70 years.
The model predicts that the earnings of at least 1.8% of all individuals increase so that the level of
earnings becomes greater than the SGA threshold (considering the years of when the individuals are 68
and 69 years of age). These estimates are very similar to the proposed 2% increases earlier on. Also,
there is no indication of any nonzero age-effect. These estimates then seem to be more robust to the
assumptions of the model as stated earlier.
The model yields no significant results of labor force participation after the transition, which could
be because of the “retirement effects”. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of individuals increasing labor
supply at the extensive margin because of the improved work incentives. Considering working hours
as the outcome variable, all results are negative and significant. These findings could have several
explanations. First, the age-trend is significant and upward sloping, which may be an issue as stated
earlier. Also, it could be that the “retirement effects” dominate. Furthermore, these estimates do not
take into account the labor force participation-rate. Considering working hours of the individuals with
a positive labor supply, the model predicts positive results of the work incentive-effects (not shown). In
other words, the work incentives seem to only have an impact on the intensive margin when considering
labor supply.
6 Conclusion
Bound (1989) argued that rejected DI applicants form a natural control group for allowed applicants,
and that the observed outcomes of this group serve as upper-bound estimates of the potential earnings
and labor supply of DI recipients. By using a reweighting approach similar to the one of Singleton
(2012), I have investigated Bound’s initial hypothesis for Norwegian DI recipients, and also provided
upper-bound estimates of the potential earnings and labor supply of Norwegian DI recipients. I find
evidence of rejected applicants not necessarily indicating an upper-bound of the potential earnings and
labor supply of allowed applicants. I also find evidence of Norwegian DI recipients aged 18-61 years by
the award decision exhibiting limited earnings and labor supply potentials.
By using the same initial sample of Norwegian applicants, I have also investigated an area which
has not been given much attention in the literature. When Norwegian DI recipients are transferred to
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the retirement program at the age of 67, the individuals are eligible for the same amount of pension
benefits as the prior amount of DI benefits. The work incentives of the former DI recipients, however,
change significantly. I investigate Norwegian DI recipients who were 62-65 years of age when awarded
DI benefits, and find evidence of some individuals responding to the improved work incentives. Also, I
find significant evidence of bunching behavior of DI recipients before being transferred to the retirement
program. There is no evidence of such behavior after the transition, and evidence of increased mass in
the segment above the earnings threshold.
A caveat of my first analysis is that the estimates only can be interpreted as upper-bound estimates.
Although giving certain indications, the estimates do not get the complete picture of whether some DI
recipients may be able to work, and how DI recipients respond to financial incentives. I investigate this
topic in the next section, but the findings of this analysis apply to older DI recipients who were awarded
the full level of benefits. Therefore, they do not necessarily give satisfactory indications about the
behavior of younger DI recipients. Also, the analysis of retiring DI beneficiaries investigates individuals
that are allowed to keep the same amount of benefits. Therefore, this analysis does not add too much
information about the potential earnings and labor supply of DI recipients in the counterfactual state of
not being awarded DI benefits.
Taken as a whole, we still do not know enough about the behavior of Norwegian DI beneficiaries.
Also, little is yet known about the effects of so called return-to-work programs that have already been
introduced in Norway, and which still is under consideration in the US. Although this thesis may helps
closing that gap, further investigations are needed to understand the various effects of the Norwegian DI
program.
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Appendix Graphs and Tables
Figure A.1: Trends in the incidence of DI receipt in Norway
Notes: The Norwegian DI trends are based on those of Kostol & Mogstad (2014). Incidence of DI receipt is defined as the
fraction of the adult population (individuals aged 18-67 years) receiving DI benefits.
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Figure A.2: Age Distribution of the Full Sample of DI applicants 18-65 Years of Age
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Notes: The figure shows the age distribution of the full unrestricted sample of Norwegian DI applicants. The sample consists
of all Norwegian applicants who were of 18-65 years of age by the final DI award decision, and were last observed to apply
for DI benefits between 1998-2003. The final DI award decision is defined as the last DI application that is observed for each
individual. Applicants are observed until 2010.
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Figure A.3: Economic Outcomes of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 18-61 by Final Decision,
Before and After DI Decision ($1,000)
(a) Transfers and DI Benefits
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(b) DI Indicator
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Notes: The figures show the amounts of transfers, DI benefits and the fraction of applicants on DI receipt of allowed and
rejected applicants around the year of their final DI award decision. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed
DI application that is observed for each individual. An applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by
reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010),
the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI
application during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 18-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not
been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Transfers are measured in 2005 dollars in units
of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as all cash transfers received by the government (including DI
benefits). The DI indicator is equal to one if DI benefits are greater than zero.
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Figure A.4: Economic Outcomes of Allowed and Rejected Applicants Aged 62-65 by Final Decision,
Before and After Year of Retirement ($1,000)
(a) Transfers and DI Benefits
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Year Relative to Retirement
Transfers DI Benefits
(b) DI Indicator
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Be
ne
fit
 In
di
ca
to
r
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Year Relative to Retirement
Notes: The figures show the amounts of transfers, DI benefits and the fraction of applicants on DI receipt of DI recipients
around the year of reaching the retirement age of 67 years. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that were awarded
the full level of DI benefits during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 62-65 years of age, entered the retirement program by
2005, received DI benefits in the year prior to being transferred to retirement benefits, did not die by the end of the sample
(by 2010) and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Transfers are measured
in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as all cash transfers received by the
government (including DI benefits). The DI indicator is equal to one if DI benefits are greater than zero.
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Figure A.5: Earnings Distribution of Allowed Applicants in the Years around Retirement, by Age
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(c) Individuals 67 Years of Age
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Notes: The figures show the earnings distributions of the respective age-groups of DI recipients as they are transferred to
retirement benefits at the age of 67. Only individuals with positive levels of earnings and a positive level of working hours are
included. The green lines report Kernel densities using a bandwidth of 1.6. The sample includes all Norwegian applicants that
were awarded the full level of DI benefits during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 62-65 years of age, entered the retirement
program by 2005, received DI benefits in the year prior to being transferred to retirement benefits, did not die by the end of
the sample (by 2010) and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Earnings
are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income plus
business income.
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Table A.1: Logit estimation: All Applicants Aged 18-61 by Final Decision
Robust
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-stat
Age -0.0782*** (0.0105) -7.49
Age squared 0.0013*** (0.0001) 10.26
Female 0.1806*** (0.0469) 3.85
Married 0.0663 (0.0602) 1.10
Foreign -0.4663*** (0.0716) -6.51
Children -0.8251*** (0.0629) -13.13
Years of schooling 0.0352*** (0.0095) 3.71
Years of schooling squared -0.0018*** (0.0006) -3.24
Experience 0.1404*** (0.0188) 7.47
Experience squared -0.0046*** (0.0016) -2.90
Totally disabled 0.1881*** (0.0504) 3.73
Partially disabled -0.3111*** (0.0617) -5.04
Social Assistance -0.9182*** (0.0490) -18.73
Female*Foreign -0.1013 (0.0682) -1.49
Female*Married -0.6549*** (0.0563) -11.62
Female*Children 0.1533*** (0.0565) 2.71
Foreign*Married -0.4251*** (0.0699) -6.08
Foreign*Children 0.1186* (0.0689) 1.72
Married*Children 0.4457*** (0.0633) 7.04
Social Assistance*Children 0.5055*** (0.0672) 7.52
Reapplied 0.6306** 0.3041 2.07
Number of reapplications 1.1818*** 0.3985 2.97
Number of reapplications squared -0.1866* 0.1103 -1.69
Years between initial and final decision -0.6684*** 0.0633 -10.54
Years between initial and final decision sq. 0.0680*** 0.0095 7.15
Constant 342.17*** 16.52 20.71
Linear time trend X
Diagnostics codes X
Earnings quantiles X
Hours of work quantiles X
State fixed-effects X
R2 0.1263
Observations 1,349,513
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level.
Notes: The table displays the main estimates of the logit model where DI award at the final decision is the dependent variable.
The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed for each individual. An applicant is
considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed to have been
allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The sample includes
all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years of 1998-2003 and were of 18-61 years
of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial observed
application.
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Table A.2: Upper-Bound and Control Group of Rejected Applicants Estimates, Applicants Aged 18-39
Years by the Final Decision
1 year pre 1 year post 3 years post 5 years post
final decision final decision final decision final decision
Difference between:
Allowed & Weighted ! ! ! !
Rejected & Weighted ! ! !
Outcomes:
Earnings -1.05** -11.40*** 0.61 -17.65*** -0.12 -20.76*** -0.77
(0.475) (0.700) (0.616) (0.824) (0.769) (0.896) (0.842)
Working Hours -0.25 -3.79*** 0.27 -7.29*** -0.14 -10.35*** -0.27
(0.247) (0.555) (0.458) (0.701) (0.608) (0.719) (0.651)
Earn > SGA -0.03** -0.46*** 0.01 -0.60*** -0.02 -0.64*** -0.03
(0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
Labor Force -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.01 -0.23*** -0.03 -0.26*** -0.01
Participation (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 24,069 24,069 4,722 24,069 4,722 24,069 4,722
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level. All estimates report bootstrap standard errors
using 500 replications.
Notes: The table displays the differences in means between the estimated outcomes of weighted applicants and the allowed
and rejected applicants, respectively. The estimates are shown for the respective years relative to the final DI award decision of
applicants. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed for each individual. An
applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed
to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The
sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years of 1998-2003 and were
of 18-39 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial
observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005
dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income plus business income.
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Table A.3: Upper-Bound and Control Group of Rejected Applicants Estimates, Applicants Aged 40-61
Years by the Final Decision
1 year pre 1 year post 3 years post 5 years post
final decision final decision final decision final decision
Difference between:
Allowed & Weighted ! ! ! !
Rejected & Weighted ! ! !
Outcomes:
Earnings -1.04 -16.42*** -4.94*** -18.91*** -4.00*** -19.45*** -3.23***
(0.774) (0.721) (0.554) (0.675) (0.562) (0.773) (0.636)
Working Hours -0.91*** -5.64*** -1.18*** -8.22*** -1.08*** -9.57*** -0.87**
(0.303) (0.389) (0.301) (0.433) (0.346) (0.448) (0.350)
Earn > SGA -0.02 -0.59*** -0.11*** -0.56*** -0.07*** -0.54*** -0.05***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Labor Force -0.00 -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.07*** -0.24*** -0.07***
Participation (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 98,614 98,614 8,572 98,614 8,572 98,614 8,572
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level. All estimates report bootstrap standard errors
using 500 replications.
Notes: The table displays the differences in means between the estimated outcomes of weighted applicants and the allowed
and rejected applicants, respectively. The estimates are shown for the respective years relative to the final DI award decision of
applicants. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed for each individual. An
applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed
to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The
sample includes all Norwegian applicants that filed their final observed DI application during the years of 1998-2003 and were
of 40-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive DI benefits prior to the initial
observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero. Earnings are measured in 2005
dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income plus business income.
49
Table A.4: Upper-Bound and Control Group of Rejected Applicants Estimates, Totally Disabled Appli-
cants Aged 18-61 Years by the Final Decision
1 year pre 1 year post 3 years post 5 years post
final decision final decision final decision final decision
Difference between:
Allowed & Weighted ! ! ! !
Rejected & Weighted ! ! !
Outcomes:
Earnings -4.01*** -19.15*** -3.27*** -20.88*** -0.15 -21.17*** 1.32
(1.254) (0.999) (0.879) (1.069) (0.940) (1.060) (0.951)
Working Hours -1.34*** -7.22*** 0.02 -9.66*** 1.16** -10.77*** 2.46***
(0.397) (0.522) (0.464) (0.580) (0.491) (0.561) (0.494)
Earn > SGA -0.10*** -0.62*** -0.05** -0.59*** 0.04** -0.56*** 0.06***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Labor Force -0.07*** -0.26*** -0.04** -0.28*** 0.00 -0.30*** 0.03*
Participation (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 78,637 78,637 6,680 78,637 6,680 78,637 6,680
*** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered on the individual level. All estimates report bootstrap standard errors
using 500 replications.
Notes: The table displays the differences in means between the estimated outcomes of weighted applicants and the allowed
and rejected applicants, respectively. The estimates are shown for the respective years relative to the final DI award decision of
applicants. The final DI award decision is defined as the last observed DI application that is observed for each individual. An
applicant is considered as allowed if initially allowed or allowed by reapplying for DI benefits. If an applicant is not observed
to have been allowed DI benefits by the end of the sample (by 2010), the applicant is defined as a rejected applicant. The
sample includes all Norwegian applicants classified as totally disabled that filed their final observed DI application during the
years of 1998-2003 and were of 18-61 years of age, did not die by the end of the sample and have not been observed to receive
DI benefits prior to the initial observed application. Labor force participation is defined as working hours greater than zero.
Earnings are measured in 2005 dollars in units of $1,000 using an exchange rate of $/NOK = 6, and are defined as labor income
plus business income.
50
